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Abstract  
Free speech is intrinsically important as a human right, but it also works as an umbrella to protect 
all other rights. Every democratic state must respect freedom of expression, while simultaneously 
establishing appropriate limitations. In Israel, free speech has become essential and a fundamen-
tal right. Its limitations are legitimated only in a tangible danger to national security or direct in-
citement to racism. However, despite the parliamentary and judiciary defense of freedom of ex-
pression, the government has found ways to limit free speech. It is often unclear how govern-
ments do that; a deeper analysis indicates that the Israeli government uses laws and sanctions to 
limit certain narratives related to the Israel-Palestine conflict. In this thesis, evidence and case 
studies demonstrate how freedom of expression is limited in Israel, in both written law and its 
practice. The national policy related to free speech consists of restrictions to different narratives 
related to the conflict, including the Palestinian narrative and the collective memory, known as 
“Nakba”. This research shows the difficulty in the promotion of understanding and peace when 
the national discourse omits other such perspectives. At the core of the Israel-Palestine conflict 
are differences between two extreme and opposing views. There is not only a physical wall di-
viding the two societies, but also a mindset that prevents them from engaging in negotiations 
with each other. Recognizing each of the other's opposing narratives and demands is therefore 
the first step towards peace, reiterating the necessity of freedom of expression. 
Keywords  
Freedom of expression, Israel-Palestine Conflict, Supreme Court, Reconciliation, narratives, ed-
ucation, civil society 
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Introduction    
 The State of Israel and the Palestine nation  have been in ongoing conflict since the last 1
century. At the core of the Israel-Palestine conflict are differences between two extreme and op-
posing views. There is not only a physical wall dividing the two societies, but also a mindset that 
prevents them from engaging in negotiations with each other: both Palestinian and Israeli leaders 
deliberately avoid communicating with each other, applying measures of intimidation and pro-
moting their own national narratives. In order to maintain the system as it is, high-level represen-
tatives from both parties restrict several aspects of freedom of expression that could potentially 
foster tolerance and understanding. 
In particular, Israel –– which self identifies as democratic  –– often deliberately restricts 2
different narratives related to the conflict. Israeli parties who seek to limit free expression on the 
national level often claim, convincingly, that it is important to do so because of concerns about 
national security or incitement to racism. In this thesis, I will critically discuss the use of national 
security as a legitimate justification for such restrictions, and contextualize this analysis by pre-
senting a series of case studies to better understand the Israeli government’s policies limiting 
freedom of speech. 
 The discussion about freedom of expression is not simple, and it is often unclear how 
governments limit citizens’ right to it. Free speech is extremely important by itself, but it is also 
used as an umbrella to protect all other human rights. However, this right is not absolute; accord-
ing to international law even the most democratic states may limit this freedom in certain cases. 
 Some would refer to this region as the Palestine State (UN 2012)1





Different historical contexts and security issues allow each state to interpret the right to freedom 
of expression in slightly different ways, and policies can vary dramatically among them. It is 
therefore not possible to define inflexible international standards for this freedom, and we must 
work instead with general rules and guidelines. 
 Every democratic state must establish appropriate limitations to free speech, but in Israel 
this task is more complicated by the fact that there is no formal constitution and freedom of ex-
pression is not included in the eleven basic laws that may be considered as a constitution.  Over 3
time, however, free speech has become essential in official documents, and it is considered a 
fundamental right. Despite the parliamentary and judiciary defense of freedom of expression, the 
government has found ways to limit free speech through laws and sanctions. In this thesis, I 
present evidence and analyze case studies demonstrating how freedom of expression is limited in 
both a practical and legal sense. I have divided the cases into four main areas: (1) Education; (2) 
Legislation; (3) Banning of films and plays; and (4) Limiting Demonstrations and excluding pub-
lic figures. Analyzing these cases helps to understand the national policy related to free speech. 
 The main conclusion is that the government tries to direct the Israeli discourse by pro-
moting the national Israeli Jewish narrative, and oppressing all other versions. At the same time, 
the judicial system, which is supposed to protect freedom of expression from being threatened by 
the government, approves limitations when they are indirect, such as budget cutting and restric-
tions in public buildings. The main argument for the sanctions that limit free speech and oppress 
certain narratives in the Israeli discourse is national security. However, this thesis offers a new 
point of view by showing that free speech limitations are a major cause of, and not a solution for, 
insecurity in Israel. 
  Israeli Knesset, The Existing Basic Laws: Full Texts (Jerusalem: Knesset website, n.d.). 3
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Chapter 1 - The Importance of Freedom of Expression as a Fundamental 
Human Right in Israel  
 In a country such as Israel, where so many different groups of people reside, the right to 
freedom of expression is important to assure that all voices are heard. This basic human right, 
considered very valuable by most Israeli citizens, is widely protected by national law. However, 
over the past few years, certain circles — primarily those composed of conservative politicians, 
journalists, public figures and organizations — have sought to limit freedom of expression and 
have drastically increased the number of objections to it, demanding that these limiting changes 
be made. 
 It is not simple to study, research, or explain the status of freedom of expression in Israel 
without coming from the international law perspective. As previously noted, freedom of expres-
sion is not an absolute right,  and interpretations and limitations vary across geographic regions. 4
Moreover, although Israel does not have a single document recognized as a constitution and the 
basic laws do not clearly grant freedom of expression as a fundamental right, the Supreme Court 
(SC) of Israel safeguards this freedom as one of the fundamental laws, deriving its authority to 
do so from previous judgments, political events, Israel’s Declaration of Independence, and the 
ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).  In this chapter, 5
I will start by explaining the importance of freedom of expression, then its status within in-
ternational law and, finally, define the status of this type of freedom in Israel based on the Israeli 
legal system. 
 Ohchr.org, 'International Covenant On Civil And Political Rights', Article 19, 2015, http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinter4 -
est/pages/ccpr.aspx.
 Daniel Rothstein, 'Adjudication Of Freedom Of Expression Cases Under Israel’S Unwritten Constitution', Cornell International 5
Law Journal 18 (1985): 248.
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1. Freedom of Expression in the International Arena  
A.  The Importance of Free Speech 
 According to Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), every-
one has the right to freedom of opinion and expression.  This Article allows people to express, 6
manifest, seek, and receive information and ideas as they wish. Freedom of expression is the 
foundation on which several other rights are built. It is the tool that helps to exposes violations 
and abuses; without being able to speak freely and report transgressions, it would not be possible 
to recognize, remedy, or fight violations against human rights. Conversely, the suppression of 
this specific freedom is the first step towards the constraint of all other human rights. As the 
American writer, statesman, and social reformer Frederick Douglass once said, “liberty is mean-
ingless where the right to utter one’s thoughts and opinions has ceased to exist. That, of all rights, 
is the dread of tyrants. It is the right […] they first of all strike down. They know its power.”  7
  Freedom of expression, in addition to protecting every other human right, also carries 
important meaning by itself, on both individual and national levels. The individual level points 
out two concrete rights for individuals: the right to speak and the right to know. As Article 19 of 
the UDHR states, the right to speak is the key to development, dignity, and fulfillment of every 
person because it allows people to engage with and learn about the wider world and their place in 
it. Similarly, the right to know is significant and fundamental in democratic societies: by ex-
changing information freely with others, citizens feel secure and respected by both the society 
and the state, and live their lives accordingly. On the national level, freedom of expression is 
  Un.org, 'The Universal Declaration Of Human Rights | Article 19', 2015, http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-6
rights/index.html.
 Frederick Douglass, speaking in the Boston Music Hall after an anti-slavery meeting had been broken up. Philip Sheldon Foner 7
and Robert J Branham, Lift Every Voice (Tuscaloosa, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1998): 356.
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necessary for a reasonable democratic and civilized society. Such freedom contributes to the 
quality of the society and the government in four main ways. First, it allows free debate about 
and among political parties, helping to ensure that talented and honest people will have the 
chance to administer the state. Second, it promotes a good-willed society by enabling citizens to 
raise their concerns about and with the authorities and private bodies. Third, it assures that poli-
cies and legislation are carefully considered during public debates. Fourth, as Frederick Douglass 
emphasized, it is the basis of other human rights.  8
B. Freedom of Expression in International Law and Its Limitations 
 Despite the importance of the right to freedom of expression as both individual and na-
tional concern, it is not an absolute right and, since it applies to an extensive range of human ac-
tivity, it can be limited. A good example of an absolute right, with no other interests to strike its 
balance, is the right of an individual not to be subjected to torture: no declaration or treaty allows 
torture under any circumstance. This is not the situation with freedom of expression. The right to 
freedom of expression can be limited on behalf of public safety, national security, public order, 
morality, as well as to protect the individual or collective rights of others. As the precise contours 
of free speech are malleable, it is often restricted in cases where the aforementioned issues 
present a grave and imminent danger to maintaining public safety and protecting the rights of 
others. For example, speech intended to incite violence against a particular group would not be 
acceptable since it puts that group in real danger; as the popular saying goes, one person’s free-
doms end where they infringe on the rights of others.  9
 Eric Barendt, 'Religious Hatred Laws: Protecting Groups Or Belief?', Res Publica 17, no. 1 (2011): 44, doi:10.1007/s11158-011-8
9142-6.
 Rachel Marsden, 'Your Rights End Where Mine Begin | Human Events', Human Events, 2011, http://humanevents.com/9
2011/09/18/your-rights-end-where-mine-begin/.
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 The interconnected nature of freedom of expression and other fundamental rights means 
that restricting the right to freedom of expression through any manner makes restricting any oth-
er right even easier. As such, defining the scope of free expression and creating international 
standards which all states must follow is important.  The UDHR is not legally binding, but its 10
application to the national affairs of states has been repeatedly acknowledged in subsequent in-
ternational treaties, regional human rights instruments, national constitutions, and other laws. 
Many international treaties mention freedom of expression but, unlike the UDHR, the parties in 
those treaties understand that it is important to point out the tension between freedom of expres-
sion and other human rights, and so limitations are set within the treaties. One of the first treaties 
to anchor freedom of speech was the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (IC-
CPR), which expanded Article 19 of the UDHR in order to apply three further categories. The 
first two categories are similar to Article 19 of the UDHR, but the third category presents a limi-
tation on the first two, by saying that it is possible to limit the right to freedom of expression in 
consideration of the “respect of the rights or reputations of others and for the protection of na-
tional security, only if it is necessary to protect the public.”  11
 Other regional and international treaties, such as The European Convention for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in its Article 10, mention that everyone has 
the right to freedom of expression within certain civic contexts. In that treaty specifically, the 
exercise of these freedoms carries duties and responsibilities that contain conditions and restric-
tions. The restrictions are: interests of national security, territorial integrity, or public safety; pre-
 Dinah PoKempner, A Shrinking Realm: Freedom Of Expression Since 9/11, World Report 2007 (Human Rights Watch, 2007): 10
64 - 65. 
 Ohchr.org, 'International Covenant On Civil And Political Rights', 2015, http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/11
ccpr.aspx.
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vention of disorder or crime; protection of health or morals; and protection of the reputation or 
rights of others.  The few central exceptions to free expression are incitements to violence or 12
hatred and threats to national security or public order in the above mentioned forms. Similarly, 
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(ICEAFRD)  and the European Union Framework Decision on Racism and Xenophobia (EU-13
FDRX)  all restrict any kind of incitement of violence against another group and allow freedom 14
of expression to be limited in the interest of national security. 
 In general, ‘limitations’ or ‘restrictions’ are considered to be any action by a public body 
that has an actual effect on people’s right to freedom of expression. According to the aforemen-
tioned conventions and treaties, there are three clear conditions that the society or the state has to 
follow in order to guarantee that such limitations are legitimate. First, the limitations must be 
provided by the law and not at the whim of any given public official: the limitations must be ap-
plied through a clear and accurate law or regulation that is formally recognized by those entrust-
ed with lawmaking. Second, the limitations have to assert a legitimate aim. A list of legitimate 
aims is provided in Article 19, paragraph 3, of the ICCPR and it is not open-ended: “respect for 
the rights and reputations of others […] and protection of national security, public order, public 
health or morals.”  Third, limitations must be truly necessary to achieve a given legitimate legal 15
  Council of Europe, European Convention On Human Rights, F-67075 Strasbourg Cedex, 2010, http://www.echr.coe.int/Doc12 -
uments/Convention_ENG.pdf. 
  Ohchr.org, 'International Convention On The Elimination Of All Forms Of Racial Discrimination Article 4', 2015, http://13
www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CERD.aspx.
  Council of the European Union, Framework Decision On Racism And Xenophobia, 8665/07 (Presse 84) (Luxembourg: The 14
European Union, 2007); 2. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/misc/93739.pdf.
 Ohchr.org, 'International Convention On The Elimination Of All Forms Of Racial Discrimination Article 19 (3)’, 2015, http://15
www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CERD.aspx.
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aim and should only be pursued where no alternative means exist to achieve the same end with-
out limiting freedom of expression.   16
C. Different Applications and Approaches for International Law Definitions of Freedom of 
Expression and Its Limitations 
 Despite the relative clarity of international laws, there are still differences in the way each 
region implements freedom of expression and its accompanying limitations, and a state’s sense 
of identity and historical context greatly influence how it limits freedom of expression. For ex-
ample, the United States of America interprets and implements the law differently than Europe 
by giving a wider scope to freedom of speech and only forbidding imminent lawless action. That 
is, the USA limits only expressions that call for or could cause a violent (re)action (e.g: decep-
tively shouting “Fire!” in a crowded theatre). All other types of false expressions are allowed: the 
only way to fight them is to rebuff with a true expression, or to seek legal redress for libel or 
slander after such civil wrongs. In Europe, the situation is somewhat different in that expressions 
of racism are expressly not allowed. A good example is the case of Otto Preminger Institut vs. 
Austria, where the judge referred to the social obligation to avoid expressions which “do not con-
tribute to any form of public debate capable of furthering progress in human affairs.”  Such di17 -
visions between American and European notions of free expression have derived from differing 
historical contexts, specifically because of the latter’s experiences from World War II and the 
 Ibid, “…are provided by law and are necessary.”16
 Otto-Premmger-Institut vs. Austria (European Court of Human Rights 1994): 14.17
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Holocaust. Similarly, in the USA, it is illegal to burn a cross because of its association with Ku 
Klux Klan’s doings, whereas in Europe no such limitation exists.   18
 In addition to historical contexts, the ‘real intention’ behind statements plays a major role 
in the discussion of freedom of expression. When an expression’s intent has negative goals and 
involves violence and hate, it is most likely that a given state will forbid it. When there is no in-
tention to incite violence, but the aim is rather to ask legitimate questions of the state authorities, 
some limitations should be considered carefully. For example, the historian Bernard Lewis was 
found liable by a civil court in France for denying the Armenian Genocide after he rejected the 
use of the term ‘Armenian Genocide.’ Whether Lewis intended to raise a real academic discus-
sion or to promote other interests is relevant: when the intention is to produce a discourse with-
out incitement the expression should be allowed. However, it is often difficult to truly determine 
intent, and the French civil court found that Lewis’ aim was in fact to deny the occurrence of the 
Armenian Genocide and fined him for contravening Europe’s laws against the promotion of 
racism.  19
2. Freedom of Expression in Israel  
A. The Problematic Nature of Israeli Law  
 Israel, unlike the United States, has no single document combining all basic laws together 
as a constitution and granting the judiciary system the power of striking down legislation which 
clearly violates constitutional content. As Ruth Levush notes, “the Israeli Declaration of Inde-
 Wilson Huhn, 'Cross Burning As Hate Speech Under The First Amendment To The United States Constitution', Amsterdam 18
Law Forum 2, 1 (2009): 19-24, http://amsterdamlawforum.org/article/view/103/184.
 Yair Auron, 'Armenian Genocide - Not ‘Armenia, Armenia’, Not ‘Armenian Massacre', From The Journal "History", no. 12 19
(2015): 57 - 76.
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pendence, issued on May 14, 1948, following the termination of the British mandate over Pales-
tine, envisioned the existence of a future formal constitution for Israel. The Declaration, howev-
er, has never been viewed as a constitutional document by itself.”  The Declaration of Indepen20 -
dence of Israel’s Constituent Assembly was designated to prepare a constitution by October 1, 
1948, but entanglements caused by the tension between human rights legislation and religion 
continue to delay the country’s written constitution to the present day.  Despite this lack of for21 -
mal constitution, Israel still has its own set of laws and basic rules that apply to the foundations 
of government and individual rights. Whilst legislation may be interpreted in several ways, the 
Israeli SC states that laws should be interpreted in a way consistent with the principles expressed 
in the country’s Declaration of Independence. Thus, the Israeli SC has managed to develop fun-
damental constitutional principles that in other Western democracies are generally already pro-
tected by their constitutions.  22
 By virtue of the Harrari Resolution of 1950, the Knesset (Israel’s Parliament) agreed that, 
once compiled, the Israeli Constitution would contain separate chapters, each termed a “basic 
law.” Eleven basic laws have been passed, and concern the following: the Knesset itself, the 
Lands of Israel, the President of the State, the Government, the State Economy, the State Army, 
Jerusalem as Capital of Israel, the State Judiciary, the State Comptroller, Human Dignity and 
Freedom, and the Freedom of Occupation. In the 1995 landmark case Bank Hamizrahi 
Hameuchad Ltd. et al. vs. Migdal Kfar Shitufi, the SC of Israel recognized, even before the com-
pletion of a single-document constitution, two of the aforementioned basic laws –– Human Dig-
 Ruth Levush, 'Features - Guide To The Israeli Legal System - Updated', Llrx.Com, 2015, http://www.llrx.com/features/20
israel2.htm.
  Haknesset, 'Knesset As A Constituent - Constitution And Basic Laws', accessed 19 November 2015, http://main.knesset.gov.il/21
Activity/Legislation/Pages/BasicLawsAndConstitution.aspx.
 Levush, 'Features - Guide To The Israeli Legal System’22
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nity and Freedom, and Freedom of Occupation –– as ones belonging to a higher normative sta-
tus. 
B. Freedom of Expression in the Israeli Law: Historical Context 
 Remarkably, the right to freedom of expression is not mentioned in Israel’s Declaration of 
Independence or in any of the basic laws: these laws are the legal basis of Israeli society, so a 
discussion of context and intention is arguably more important and more difficult. However, the 
SC of Israel is still able to safeguard this fundamental human right.  In order to understand the 23
nature of the power of this freedom, it is necessary to follow the development of human rights in 
Israel. We must look carefully at past decisions under Israeli jurisdiction that developed a certain 
historical precedent of commitment to freedom of expression. 
 In 1954, the right to freedom of expression gained protection by the Israeli SC for the 
first time as part of an intervention in a government decision when the SC protected the right to 
freedom of expression for the newspaper “The People's Voice.” In this case, the SC defined free-
dom of expression as well as its boundaries. The assigned judge, Shimon Agranat, accepted the 
petition of the paper against the government’s decision to shut down the newspaper. Agranat 
based his decision on the Declaration of Independence, with a long judgement basing freedom of 
expression as a supreme constitutional law in Israel. Moreover, he stated for his successors the 
way they should continue to protect civil rights and freedom of expression when they conflict 
with other interests. The judgment stated the principle of “near certainty test,” whereby freedom 
 Rothstein, 'Adjudication Of Freedom Of Expression Cases Under Israel’S Unwritten Constitution', 248.23
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of expression should be withdrawn only when there is a near certainty of substantial and serious 
harm to other more crucial interests.   24
 Although traces of many different legal systems can be found in Israeli law, it was found-
ed on British Common Law, a relic of Israel’s colonial past.  Currently, there is little direct in25 -
fluence of British Common Law on that of Israel, but certain historical terms have carried over. 
One of them is known as “binding precedent,”  a method which requires an interpretation of the 26
legislation according to precedents set by the courts –– unlike legal systems based on codified 
law –– to find an answer to each case.  Therefore, Shimon Agranat’s decision in the 1954 case 27
has to be taken into consideration in every ensuing case revolving around issues of freedom of 
expression. 
C. Freedom of Expression in the Israeli Law: Current Days 
 Subsequently, the right to freedom of expression was indeed protected and promoted by 
the Israeli legal system, culminating in the 1992 ratification of the ICCPR. By signing the IC-
CPR, the State of Israel committed itself to freedom of expression and its respective allowed lim-
itations:  freedom of expression can only be restricted in cases where a threat to national securi28 -
 The people's voice v. Ministery of Interior, 73/53 (SC 1953).24
 “Politics and Government in Israel”, p. 194.25




 Black's Law Dictionary, p. 1059 (5th ed. 1979)27
 “The Israeli State is committed to the ICCPR since January 1992,”  B'tselem, 'International Law', 2011, http://www.btse28 -
lem.org/hebrew/international_law/covenant_on_civil_and_political_rights.
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ty or incitement of racism and discrimination is present, and members of Israeli society must be 
allowed to openly evaluate and criticize the government.    29
 However, since freedom of expression is still not solidly defined within Israeli law, the 
SC keeps a wide interpretation of the manner in which citizens enjoy this right, considering both 
international norms and specific Israeli contexts. The SC of Israel intervenes consistently on 
government decisions in order to maintain its authority over this right. In that regard, a long peri-
od without intervention could make the Court’s future interventions to be seen as less 
legitimate.  Although the right to freedom of expression is not enshrined in Israel’s eleven basic 30
laws, it is still included within their domain. The local Attorney General Guidelines, in dis-
cussing the right to protest (which is itself inherent to the freedom of expression), refer to this 
right as a fundamental one. 
 The Attorney General adds that, “District Commander, granting a license to hold a 
demonstration, does not grace with the applicants, but allows them to exercise a fundamental 
right, and therefore it is appropriate that the commander gave the license, unless considerations 
of public safety or public order prevent the grant of a license or require that limits the license’s 
terms and conditions.”  Another update related to freedom of expression came with the Preven31 -
tion of Terrorism Ordinance: “an indictment in the case because of the type of expression that 
falls binding expressions defined in the Ordinance to consider on the one hand the interest in 
  Acri.org.il, 'Association For Civil Rights In Israel (ACRI)Freedom Of Expression  |', 2015, http://www.acri.org.il/en/category/29
democracy-and-civil-liberties/freedom-of-expression/.
 Rothstein, “Adjudication of Freedom of Expression Cases under Israel’s Unwritten Constitution”, p. 248.30
  Attorney General, Constitutional Law Constitutional Rights - Freedom Of Expression; Freedom Of Demonstration (Jerusalem: 31
Haknesset, 2003).
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preventing this kind of harsh words, and on the other hand the principle of freedom of expres-
sion, which is the basic values of Israel as a free and democratic society.”  32
 Further evidence defining freedom of expression as a fundamental and basic law which 
takes precedence over other legal and governmental documents is found in the instructions for 
the Authority for Television and Radio. Adopted in 1994, the instructions’ aim was to start the 
discussion about the importance of the freedom of expression’s principle in Israel, “including the 
right to express unpopular opinions or deviations.”  Also, the Council for Cable and Satellite 33
Broadcasts agreed that it may not shut down a televised show seen as very provocative. The 
council justified its decision by saying that shutting down such a show would lead to a violation 
of the principles of freedom of expression in Israel.  34
 The single most influential person in determining freedom of expression as a fundamental 
Israeli law is Aharon Barak, the President of the SC of Israel from 1995 to 2006. He focused on 
converting and shaping the existing basic laws and other democratic values into something ap-
proaching a constitution. Barak’s approach, which was adopted by the SC in 1992, brought val-
ues such as the right to equality, freedom of employment, and freedom of expression to a posi-
tion of normative supremacy and thereby granted all courts the ability to strike down legislation 
which is inconsistent with the rights embodied in the basic laws and democracy. In his article 
“Freedom of Information and the Court,” he explains that freedom of expression is a supreme 
  Attorney General, Directive - 2:11 Approval Of The State Prosecutor And The Attorney General To File An Indictment For An 32
Offense Under The Prevention Of Terrorism Ordinance (Jerusalem: Haknesset, 1997).
  The Council of the Authority for Television and Radio, The Instructions For The Authority For Television And Radio 33
(Jerusalem: Haknesset, 1994)..
  Council for Cable and Satellite Broadcasts, Decisions Of The Council For Cable And Satellite Broadcasting On The Subject: 34
Television Program "Night Fun" Channel "Beep" (Jerusalem, 2009).
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right with a place of honor in the Hall of Fundamental Human Rights. He goes on to explain that 
this right is an integral part of the Israeli legal ethos, and is a precious element of democracy.  35
 The United Nations website mentions the Israeli implementation of freedom of expres-
sion and how important it is that the state continues to consider it a priority. A USA Human 
Rights Report from 2014 also explained, “the Israeli Law provides for freedom of speech and the 
government generally respected this right. An independent press, an effective judiciary and a 
functioning democratic political system combined to promote freedom of speech and of the 
press.”  We may conclude that it is consistent with international laws: “individuals may criticize 36
the government without reprisal. The law prohibits hate speech and incitement to violence, and 
the 1948 Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance prohibits expressing support for illegal or terrorist 
organizations.”  37
 In conclusion, freedom of expression, with its limitations, is considered essential for a 
democratic state such as Israel. The international community defines freedom of expression as an 
important right, allowing for constraints only in face of a concrete threat. Israel did not consider 
freedom of expression in the basic law, but the government and the legal system nonetheless 
promoted this right as fundamental. Currently, the legal system and the government report that 
Israel practices freedom of expression and is committed to this right on an international standard.  








Chapter 2 - How Does the Israeli Government Limit Freedom of Expression 
Regarding the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict? 
 In this part of my thesis I will discuss how the Israeli government limits freedom of ex-
pression related to the Palestinian conflict and the different responses of the SC to each case. In 
Israel, the legislature and the government rule together with the judicial system and have to con-
sider one another when making decisions limiting freedom of expression. I divide the chapter 
into the four main fields in which the Israeli government enforces these limitations: education, 
legislation, art, and protesting. I will present evidence and examples in each field to show both 
the restrictions and the resistance to the limitations and sanctions as documented by human rights 
organizations, government opposition groups, and the Israeli SC. In some cases, the judiciary 
system repeals the government's decisions limiting free speech or reduces the government sanc-
tions significantly, while in other cases, the limitations have been validated. 
1. Education 
Banning Teaching Nakba or any Elements of the Palestinian Narrative in Schools 
 The Israeli-Jewish narrative of the 1948 war is promoted in Israel’s public eduction sys-
tem. The war was first perceived as a war of independence: a battle against seven Arab countries 
who opposed the UN’s decision to establish Israel as a nation, a decision that ultimately ac-
knowledged the Jews’ right to live in their promised land. However, the Palestinian narrative is 
different. It sees noting but Israelis expelling hundreds of thousands of Palestinians from their 
homeland, occupying territories, and destroying villages and civilians. This narrative, called 
Nakba by the Palestinians, is presented as one long catastrophe. Nonetheless, it must be conced-
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ed that a large Palestinian population, comprised of those who were not killed or expelled, were 
able to remain in their homes in Israeli territory.  Nowadays, they are considered a minority and 38
go by the name of Arab-Israelis. This minority and various groups in Israel now want to incorpo-
rate Nakba within the Israeli educational system as an appendix to the history of Israel and of its 
conflict with the Palestinians.  
 During the 1980s, scholars and historians started to point out the manipulation that Jew-
ish Israeli historiography engages in, and the serious problems it contains in relating to the public 
educational system. The New Historians movement has been challenging the Jewish Israeli nar-
rative and its historiography ever since its creation. At first, this movement was criticized and not 
accepted. Due to a vast effort to show the problematic and biased point of view of the Zionist 
narrative,  however, over time the New Historians caused many Israelis to change the way they 
perceived their history, and worked in many spheres to bring to light other narratives besides the 
Jewish Israeli one.  Only lately, however, has there been considerable discussion about the prob39 -
lems of teaching only the Jewish Israeli narrative in schools, including the Arab-Israeli schools, 
even though this narrative has always been suspect in Arab-Israeli eyes.  
 The attempt of both Jewish and Arab educators to bring some of the Palestinian narrative 
to the Israeli educational system has never been successful. In 2001, Dan Bar-On Sami Adwan 
developed the idea of the Dual Narrative Teaching Process. According to this technique, Pales-
tinians and Israelis should learn the historical narratives of one another. In 2009, Adwan and Bar-
On published a textbook entitled “To Learn the Historical Narrative of the Other.” The textbook 
presents the central historical narratives of Israelis and Palestinians side-by-side. Each page in 
 Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 'Necropolitical Debris: The Dichotomy Of Life And Death', State Crime Journal 4, no. 1 (2015): 38
35 - 39, doi:10.13169/statecrime.4.1.0034.
 Ilan Pappé, 'Fifty Years Through The Eyes Of ‘New Historians’ In Israel', Middle East Report, 1998.39
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the textbook is divided into three sections of equal length: the Israeli narrative on the right, the 
Palestinian on the left, and in the middle are empty lines for students to write their own reactions 
to the historical narratives.  The textbook and The Dual Narrative Teaching Process were glob40 -
ally well-received, and various movements and states showed great interest and adopted their 
methods. Unfortunately, the textbook was rejected for use in both the Israeli educational system 
and the Palestinian educational system, with each government claiming the textbooks were inap-
propriate for their respective national curriculums.  41
 However, after 52 years of teaching only the Zionist narrative in the Arab-Israeli schools, 
in 2002 the Office of Education announced that it was considering adding some of the Palestin-
ian narrative's elements, but only to the Arab-Israeli educational system. Since Arab-Israelis have 
strong connections with the Palestinian nation, this seemed to be a natural and required step. The 
new curriculum thus gave the Arab-Israelis an opportunity to incorporate something of their 
identity within the educational system. Unfortunately, powerful right-wing parties in the Knesset 
opposed the move, and in 2007 called for an emergency meeting of the Education, Culture and 
Sports Committee to discuss their disagreement with the new curriculum.  
 Yuli Tamir, Minister of education at that time, noted that the curriculum was approved in 
2002, prior to her appointment as Minister, but said she supported it in any case. She claimed 
that the new curriculum would allow the Arab-Israeli students to see themselves reflected in the 
textbook.  Mohammed Barakeh, an Arab-Israeli member of the committee, said in the meeting 42
 "The Dual Narrative Teaching Process: Palestinians and Israelis Learning the Historical Narrative of the Other," united states 40
institution of peace, accessed Nov 17, 2015, http://www.usip.org/events/the-dual-narrative-teaching-process-palestinians-and-
israelis-learning-the-historical-narrati.  
 "The two narratives of the two people's - chronicle of disqualification of a textbook," the teacher union, accessed Nov 17, 41
2015, https://www.itu.org.il/?CategoryID=1772&ArticleID=17038.  
  The Education, Culture and Sport committee, Protocol No. 294 (Jerusalem: The 17th Knesset, 2007).42
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that after the establishment of Israel in 1948, the Arab citizens did not feel independent. Instead, 
they felt “Nakba.” In other words, they felt displaced and rejected due to the crushing presence 
of a military government, the expropriation of land, and above all, the anti-Arab discrimination 
which persists to the present day. This is what the Arab-Israelis remember and this is their her-
itage. Barakeh added that this narrative should also be transmitted to the Jewish students in order 
to promote pluralism, democracy and a habit of respectfully listening to one another.  Barakeh 43
proved to be a dissenting minority within the committee, for by a six to one vote the committee 
decided to ban the presentation of two perspectives on Israel's War of Independence from the ed-
ucational textbooks. Barakeh claimed that exclusion of the Palestinian narrative in the Arab-Is-
raeli curriculum would contribute to the process of their alienation from the state and thereby 
undermine the coexistence of the Arab-Israelis within the State of Israel.  44
 To this day, it is forbidden to teach the two perspectives in both Arab and Jewish schools. 
Teachers who instruct parts of the Palestinian narrative do so secretly, in fear that at any moment 
their jobs could be taken away from them.  The explanation offered by Gideon Sa’ar, Minister 45
of Education in 2009, is this: “there is no reason for a formal curriculum of the State of Israel to 
display statehood as a catastrophe or disaster.”  Further explanations focus on the dangers of 46
teaching the Arab-Israeli youth about the “war crimes” (unarguable) perpetrated against their 
previous generations. According to this view, it is highly possible that this type of curriculum 
could turn the Arab-Israeli youth or any youth against Israel. Similarly, many of those who run 
Jewish schools claim there is no point in teaching this narrative, since it is not the Jewish-Israeli 
 Protocol Number 294, 200743
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narrative. Dov Ben-Meir, a Labor Party member and writer, supports the Ministry of Education’s 
decision, claiming that the dual narrative book distorts Israel’s history, and its sole purpose is to 
deny Israel’s legitimacy. 
 In 2000, prior to the approval of the new curriculum, Eli Podeh explained the central role 
played by textbooks in the shaping identity of Israeli’s young people. In his article “History and 
Memory in the Israeli Educational System: The Portrayal of the Arab-Israeli Conflict in History 
Textbooks (1948-2000)” he notes the powerful links between education, history, memory, identi-
ty, and beliefs, before explaining how the educational system is responsible for implanting 
knowledge and values in the younger generation. He warns that a particular textbook or curricu-
lum may alter or rewrite the past in order to suit someone’s political needs.  Howard Mehlinger, 47
in his article “International Textbook Revision: Examples from the United States” adds that text-
books convey to youths what they should know about their own culture, according to the adults’ 
beliefs.  48
 The Israeli government sees the implementation of its national narrative as an important 
issue for the new generation, and it creates laws that promote it. However, at the same time, the 
government oppresses other narratives and bans the Palestinian version of events. The 2007 
committee's decision of banning the use of the word “Nakba” in the school’s curriculum was 
never discussed in the court, and the judiciary did not review it or present its opinion. When it 
comes to protecting populations such as underage students, the minister of education and the 
government have greater capacity to limit freedoms. The discussion about this decision became 
 Elie Podeh, "History And Memory In The Israeli Educational System: The Portrayal Of The Arab-Israeli Conflict In History 47
Textbooks (1948-2000)", History &Amp; Memory 12, no. 1 (2000): 65-100, doi:10.1353/ham.2000.0005. pp. 65 - 66
 Howard Mehlinger, "International Textbook Revision: Examples From The United States", In Internationale Schulbuch48 -
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irrelevant in 2011, when the government submitted the Nakba Law banning all public institutions 
from mentioning Nakba.    
  
2. Legislation  
A. Amendment No. 40 to the Budget Foundations Law – Nakba Law 
 In 2011, the Nakba Law was introduced in Israeli parliament. This law banned the alter-
native narratives from being taught –– or even researched –– in public high schools. This law, 
serving to further marginalize the Palestinian narrative, was passed as Amendment No. 40 of the 
Budget Foundations Law, but was named the Nakba Law by the media. The law sates: “If the 
Minister of Finance sees that an entity has made an expenditure that, in essence, constitutes one 
of those specified below (in this section –– an unsupported expenditure), he is entitled, with the 
authorization of the minister responsible for the budget item under which this entity is budgeted 
or supported, after hearing the entity, to reduce the sums earmarked to be transferred from the 
state budget to this entity under any law: 1. Rejecting the existence of the State of Israel as a 
Jewish and democratic state; […] 4. Commemorating Independence Day or the day of the estab-
lishment of the state as a day of mourning.”  This law empowers the Ministry of Finance to 49
withhold public funding from institutions such as schools, universities, and local authorities that 
hold events treating the Day of Independence as a day of mourning. Furthermore, public bodies 
also would be fined for portrayals of Israel's existence as a non-Jewish democratic State.  Thus, 50
starting in 2011, any public institutions’ mention of the Palestinian narrative was a risk, even 
though this narrative interested many scholars and reflected Arab identities. The Nakba Law and 
  Adalah, Unofficial Translation Of Budget Foundations Law (Amendment No. 40) 5771 (Adalah website, 2011), http://49
www.adalah.org/uploads/oldfiles/upfiles/2011/discriminatory_laws_2011/Nakba_Law_2011_English.pdf. 
  Acri.org.il, 'The Nakba Law', 2011, https://www.acri.org.il/en/knesset/nakba-law/.50
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other forms of legislation have been aimed at undermining any narrative that does not support 
the official national Israeli narrative. Ideally, denying and banning specific narratives in public 
institutions, on the one hand, and promoting other specific narratives, on the other hand, should 
not be legitimized in any way, shape, or form in a democratic state. This law bespeaks the state’s 
lack of recognition of the non-Jewish narratives and legitimizes the continued discrimination 
against those who disagree with that narrative.  51
 The Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) explains that the law reduces the free-
dom of expression of all Israelis, both Arabs and Jews, and limits the effectiveness of public de-
bate. Prior to any effect the law may have had on institutional budgeting, it was used as a warn-
ing sign that negatively impacted the freedom of expression in Israel. Infringement on the free-
dom of expression related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict existed before the law, but with the 
law in place the violation was confirmed. The law’s broad and vague wording leads public insti-
tutions in Israel to self-censor in order to avoid any repercussions.  
 Associations that organize public-education events dealing with Nakba and the concept of 
a Jewish and democratic state have petitioned the SC to change this law. However, the Court re-
jected the petition in 2011, based on Miriam Naor’s judgment.  Naor argued that, “at this stage, 52
the petition is not ready for judgement because of the absence of the necessary, clear-cut, con-
crete, complete, and essential evidence needed to make a principled judicial decision.”  The def53 -
inition of the law is unclear, and it remains difficult to predict how it will be put into practice. 
Moreover, “legal mechanisms necessitate the following of tedious procedure before the sanction 
  ACRI.org, 'Adalah And ACRI Response To The Nakba Law', 2012, https://www.acri.org.il/he/18987. 51
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 The orthodox high school in Haifa Alumni v. The minister of Treasure and the Knesset, 3429/11 (The High Court of Justice 53
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can come into effect.”  Enforcing the law is a complex three-level process: (i) first, the Minister 54
of Finance sends the case for review and approval from the Ministry’s legal advisor; (ii) second, 
a consultation is convened with a committee composed of various entities, which must include a 
representative from the Department of Justice; and (iii) lastly, the institution has the right to re-
quest an official hearing before the law is enforced. “Even if, at the end of the day, the law af-
fects the petitioners, we do not yet know to what extent and in what circumstances it will affect 
them and others.”  The decision, therefore, was that it would be too soon to oppose the law 55
without having concrete evidences of how the Minister of Finance would use his recently ac-
quired prerogative.  
 The establishment of such a long process is not a coincidence. In the verdict, Naor de-
scribes the evolution of the law: “Initially, the proposal for the Independence Day Law was pre-
sented to Parliament. This proposal wished to enforce a ban on referring to either Independence 
Day or the establishment of the State as a “day of mourning” or “day of grief.” This ban called 
for penalties of up to three years. The proposal was abandoned, and instead Amendment No. 40 
to the Budget Foundations Law was presented to Parliament. This, too, was modified before it 
was accepted.”  The first proposal was more rigid, but the amendment which was accepted was 56
changed to accommodate practical application. After considering all the perspectives involved, 
the Court decided to approve the law with small changes related to the amount of the budget that 
could be cut.  The ACRI sees the nature of the law as a violation of free speech and claims that 57
 The orthodox high school in Haifa Alumni v. The minister of Treasure and the Knesset, 3429/11 (The High Court of Justice 54
Israel 2012).
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 Translation - The orthodox high school in Haifa Alumni v. The minister of Treasure and the Knesset, 3429/11 (The High Court 56
of Justice מן Israel 2012).
 The orthodox high school in Haifa Alumni v. The minister of Treasure and the Knesset, 3429/11 (The High Court of Justice מן 57
Israel 2012).
 27
the SC missed the opportunity to inform governmental legislators that there is a limit to this at-
tack on freedom of expression. However, the Court believes that until there is evidence of the 
law put into practice, there is no way to determine if it violates freedom of expression.  
 The SC eventually approved the law because it is not a direct ban, but a type of sanction 
that limits free speech in Israel. So far, no one can prove that they have been hurt by the law, and 
it is too early to judge its effect. The SC contended that this is not a law or clear ban, but sanction 
which involves budget cutting under a decision of the Minister of Finance. The previous law that 
involved penalty of prison, on the other side, would not be approved by the SC because it does 
not address the Israeli freedom of expression standard or the international law. The government 
changed it and sent it within the SC standards in order to pass the sanction and maintain its poli-
cy of promoting the national narrative and marginalize the other ones.  
B. The Anti-Boycott Law 
 In 2011, the Knesset passed the Anti-Boycott Law, which has been used against individu-
als or organizations who call for a boycott of the state of Israel or Israeli settlements in the West-
Bank. Organizations, movements, and even states use boycotts to protest and change policy. 
Also, movements in Israel use boycotts as a democratic tool to protest Israeli policy related to the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict.  The law was aimed against NGOs that call for boycotts, and enables 58
the Minister of Finance to impose financial penalties against these institutions. These penalties 
can include the removal of tax exemptions, and upon consultation with the Minister of Justice, 
the Minister of Finance may decide — on a case-by-case basis — the appropriate penalty. This is 
 ACRI, Israel Religious Action Center, Adalah, Yesh Din v. Minister of Finance, Minister of Justice, the Knesset, 2072/12 (The 58
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only done, however, when one knowingly publishes a public call for a boycott against the state 
of Israel, or commits to take part in one.   59
 Under clause 46 of the Income Tax Ordinance, any organization that is determined to 
have called for a boycott will not be considered a public institution. Thus, it “will not be eligible 
to receive money from the Council to Regulate Sports Gambling; will not be considered a public 
institution under clause 3(A) of the 1985 Budget Foundations Law, regarding the receipt of bud-
getary support under any budget line item; will not be eligible to utilize guarantors under the 
Guarantors on Behalf of the 1958 State Law; will not be eligible to enjoy benefits under the 1959 
Encouragement of Capital Investment Law, or under to the 1984 Encouragement of Research and 
Development in Industry Law.”  60
 The Anti-Boycott Law attracted high criticism both before and after its approval. Civil 
society organizations criticized the substance of the law, saying it disproportionately violates 
values and constitutional rights. In the international arena, the European Union, international civ-
il rights organizations, and even the American government strongly criticized the law. Even the 
legal advisor to the Knesset, Eyal Yinon, expressed his harsh stance against the law: “Under 
these circumstances, we believe that the wide definition of ‘boycott against Israel’ is a violation 
of free political expression in Israel.”  The Anti-Boycott Law imposes sanctions on calls and 61
acts of boycott that are both legal actions and a reflection of political points of view, and it does 
not separate boycotting the state as a whole and boycotting only the settlers. Despite boycotts 
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being a legitimate way to protest against governmental policy, sanctions were placed against or-
ganizations who want to use this tool.  Moreover, the law labels the boycotts of both the state 62
and the settlement products as the same act. Therefore, it obscures the line between questioning 
the legitimacy of Israeli policy related to the conflict — like the occupation and the settlements 
— and Israel's existence itself.  Most of the Israeli organizations who criticized the law argue 63
that they have no intention of harming the State of Israel, but that they want to protest against the 
government policies and boycott the settlements in the occupied territories that, from their point 
of view, are illegal.  
 The law was brought before the SC, and the petitioners argued that boycotts are legiti-
mate democratic tools, akin to demonstrations or processions, and allow citizens to express op-
position to the policies of a private or public organization. Thus, the defendant’s right to call for a 
boycott of the State of Israel is violated by the sanctions imposed on those who do so — a viola-
tion of the freedom of expression. The respondents justified the law, arguing that it comes under 
the country’s need to defend itself against those who want to destroy it or wish to change its 
character. According to them, the law is a way of defending democracy and is an integral part of 
its survival. Eventually the SC, along with a panel of nine judges, ruled that calling for any boy-
cott against Israel is illegal and Israel is within its rights to limit it. The only article that the SC 
canceled was the article that required compensation beyond the boycott’s actual damages.  64
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SC of Israel 2012).
 Barak Medina and Ilan Saban, 'Protection From The Law', HAOKETS, 2011, http://www.haokets.org/63
2011/07/12/%D7%94%D7%92%D7%A0%D7%94-%D7%9E%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%97%D7%95/.
 ACRI, Israel Religious Action Center, Adalah, Yesh Din v. Minister of Finance, Minister of Justice, the Knesset, 2072/12 (The 64
SC of Israel 2012).
 30
 The SC, leaning on the judgement of Judge Hanan Melcer and overviews of similar cases 
around the world, explained its decision based on Israel’s basic laws and the exception to the 
freedom of expression law. The Judge agreed with the respondents’ justification of the law, argu-
ing that the country needs to defend itself from political or economic terror, especially coming 
from within. He said, “calling for a boycott came within the category known as democratic para-
dox, which allows to limit the rights of those who wish to enjoy democracy in order to hit it”.  65
Moreover, “administrative restrictions against calling for boycotts have their own internal logic 
where, because those who call for a boycott often receive help in the first place from those they 
are boycotting.”  66
 Essentially, he pointed out that is counterintuitive for organizations which receive bene-
fits from the government to use those benefits to expend their activity against the government. 
Melcer did not accept the petitioners’ claims that the boycott is directed toward governmental 
policy and not the state as a whole. As a response to the petitioners’ claim about calling boycotts 
only against the settlers who present the “wrong” government policy, Melcer explained that the 
underlying purpose of the restrictions is “interest in preventing financing from parties, or indi-
viduals who call for a boycott against Israel, in a manner that discriminates against citizens, us-
ing forceful means, which actually hurts the free market of opinions and seeks to force the vic-
tims boycott the boycotters’ position.”  67
 Lastly, in order to endorse the law, there is a long and complex process: the ministry of 
finance has to find damages caused by the law, a connection between the damages and the orga-
 A translation of Judge Melcer, ACRI, Israel Religious Action Center, Adalah, Yesh Din v. Minister of Finance, Minister of Jus65 -




nization, and apparent intent or knowledge of causing such damage. This process is similar to the 
Nakba Law with its role to ensure a minimum violation of freedom of expression.  Melcer ex68 -
plains his decision, saying, “it is hard to dispute that the Anti-Boycott Law indeed violates free-
dom of expression, however there is not a violation of the nuclear component of freedom of ex-
pression, even though it is a political statement, because the limitation is relatively limited and 
applies only to call for a boycott against Israel.”  Therefore, Melcer determined the law’s priori69 -
ty, and that the legislator has the right to withdraw benefits in such a case. Similarly to the Nakba 
Law case, the SC approved a governmental law that does not directly restrict the free speech in 
Israel, but involved financial sanctions instead. These sanctions also suit the Israeli national 
agenda of limiting any narrative that does not support the official narrative and Israeli State poli-
cy.  
3. Banning Films and Plays that Present Alternative Discourses and Views  
A. The Film Tremor in Gaza 
 In the summer of 2015, the legal adviser of Be'er Sheva Municipality told Forum Negev 
Coexistence for Civil Equality that they could not present the film Tremor in Gaza in buildings 
belonging to the municipality. Tremor in Gaza is a Dutch film documenting the meetings of ex-
pert trauma care practitioners and aid workers in Gaza who are dealing with mourning and trau-
ma after the summer of 2014. Projecting the film in Israel is an attempt to bring in something 
from Gaza citizens’ narrative into the Israeli discourse. The ban was based on laws that forbid 
political propaganda within territories of the municipality allocated.  
 ACRI, Israel Religious Action Center, Adalah, Yesh Din v. Minister of Finance, Minister of Justice, the Knesset, 2072/12 (The 68
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 The ACRI clarified that the law, concerning political propaganda in public institutions, 
should be implemented in a limited fashion, so as not to violate the freedom of expression. In-
deed, parties should not use public assets in order to maintain party activity, but in Be'er Sheva 
municipality operations, the act is in fact censorship and violation of freedom of expression of 
minority groups.  Despite this, the municipality’s decision was not brought to court and the ban 70
continued. It is important to emphasize, however, that the screening was banned only in build-
ings belonging to the municipality, making it an indirect and specific restriction of freedom of 
expression by curtailing alternate viewpoints and opinions. Despite its implications in matters of 
freedom of expression, this restriction has not received attention from official legal entities.  
B. The Film Jenin, Jenin  
 Jenin, Jenin is a controversial documentary from 2002 by the Arab-Israeli filmmaker 
Mohammed Bakri. The film was prepared following the Israel Defense Force’s (IDF) battle 
in the Jenin refugee camp during the operation “Defensive Shield” in 2002. The 
documentary provides stories and evidence from the Palestinian residents of Jenin about the at-
tack in the city. Israeli military personnel, artists and scholars were shocked by the perspective 
presented by Bakri throughout the film. They argue that the film is saturated with lies and events 
that never happened. The testimonials in the film present IDF soldiers as war criminals.  The 71
gap between the narratives of Israelis and Palestinians involved in the battle led to controversy 
and the prohibition of screening the film in Israel. After the film was screened in the Cinemath-
eque Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, the Film Review Board banned the film from screening in Israel. 
 ACRI.org, 'ACRI To Beersheba Municipality: Allow The Screening Of "Tremor In Gaza', 2015, http://www.acri.org.il/he/70
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The board explained that the film could significantly impact the feelings of the public, who may 
mistakenly think that soldiers systematically performed war crimes, which the board considers 
untruthful.  72
 Bakri appealed the Censor Board’s decision forbidding the screening of his movie. The 
SC decided that the council's decision was inconsistent with the basic law of “Human Dignity 
and Liberty,” and accepted the claim of the petitioner. Justice Ayala Procaccia said that “the re-
striction does not meet the standard of proportionality. In light of this, the prohibition against the 
film cannot stand before our judicial review, and we must intervene in the Council's decision.”  73
The decision harms the petitioner's freedom of expression and those of the participants in the 
movie. Justice Dalia Dorner stated, “the Council, like every other government body, has no mo-
nopoly over the truth. It was not granted the authority to expose the truth by silencing expression 
that members of the Council consider to be lies.”  The public should be free to assess different 74
perspectives of events; they must be exposed to a range of opinions and statements, and freely 
decide what they believe is true. Moreover, the council has other tools available besides prohibit-
ing the screening in order to protect viewers from inappropriate content. 
 The discussion about the movie Jenin, Jenin illustrates the SC’s policy not to allow direct 
limitation of freedom of expression. Since the council banned commercial screening of the 
movie in Israeli movie theaters, the SC had to repeal the decision. The Court reprimanded the 
council because of the attempt to completely restrict a narrative that does not comply with the 
Israeli national narrative. The SC noted that “the Council could have made use of a less blunt 




instrument.”  A complete ban of the film screening is an extreme measure and serious violation 75
of freedom of expression, and it did not pass the test of proportionality.   76
C. The Play “The Corresponding Time” 
 The play "The Corresponding Time” was performed in Haifa’s Al-Midan Theater in 
2015. It portrays a Palestinian security prisoner named Wadia, who is secretly planning to build a 
musical instrument called an “oud” to play for his fiancee at their wedding. The play follows the 
couple’s struggle against the Israeli policies and courts to confirm their wedding, and presents 
the narrative of the security prisoners. The play tries to explore the meaning of being a man in an 
Israeli prison and to discover the person behind the symbols, statistics, and clichés of the prison-
er.  77
 The debate around the play was mainly driven because its writer, Walid Daka, was in-
volved in the murder of the soldier Moshe Tamam in 1984. Tamam’s family wrote Facebook 
posts demanding cancellation of the show, or at the very least an end to its financial support from 
the Haifa municipality or any public institution. Following pressure from the Tamam family, the 
Minister of Education, Naftali Bennett, and the Minister of Culture, Miri Regev, of the Haifa 
Municipality, decided to stop the theater’s funding. 
 The organizations Adalah and the ACRI appealed to the ministers and municipality indi-
cating that stopping the theater budget because of the play would be considered a serious viola-
tion of freedom of expression. The play does not contain any incitements against individuals or 
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national security, but presents a historically marginalized narrative. Moreover, the Attorney Gen-
eral sent a message to Ragev to make it clear that she has no authority as the Minister of Culture 
to decide the contents of culture and art. According to the letter, public financial support is essen-
tial to the existence of cultural institutions. Therefore, damaging the funding of a cultural institu-
tion can harm freedom of expression. Given the great importance of freedom of expression in 
Israel, the Attorney General determined that Regev could not intervene.  78
 Following the withdrawal of its funding, the theater, together with Adalah, appealed to 
the SC. The Haifa District Court accepted the petition, and ordered the municipality to transfer 
the funds to the theater. Judge Bracha Bar-ziv ruled that the Haifa municipality must restore Al-
Midan’s financial support. Meanwhile, the theater presented a petition against the Ministry of 
Culture after its government support had been frozen since the previous June. The budget cut is 
so far estimated at 2.3 million NIS. The cut has already caused serious damage to the theater; it is 
in debt and may be forced to close. The theater is currently awaiting a court decision in connec-
tion with the freezing of its government funding.  The decision of the SC is not clear yet, but the 79
government and governmental officials stick to the new concept of budget cutting instead of di-
rectly limiting freedom of expression. Usually the SC does not repeal the decision, like in the 
Anti-Boycott and Nakba laws, but free speech is still limited through governmental policy.  
  ACRI, 'Attorney General To Regev: You Have No Authority To Stop The Support In Cultural And Artistic Works Due To Their 78
Content', 2015, https://www.acri.org.il/he/35006.
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4. Limiting Demonstrations and Excluding Public Figures due to Their Statements  
A. Intolerance in Israel Towards Statements Against the Government’s Policy During 
Summer 2014  
 Summer 2014 was an intense time for Israelis and Palestinians, who were once again ex-
periencing military conflict. The conflict increased and became what is now known as Operation 
Protective Edge, or the 2014 Israel–Gaza conflict. The operation was followed by the kidnapping 
and murder of Israeli teenagers from a settlements in the West Bank by Hamas militant activists. 
Israel-Hamas agreements were breaking, and the kidnapping only increased tensions. The con-
flict consisted of seven weeks of Israeli bombardment, Palestinian rocket attacks, and ground 
fighting, resulting in the deaths of over 2,100 people, the vast majority of them from the Gaza 
Strip.   80
 Times of crisis, war and emergency, like summer 2014, increase tendencies to silence ex-
pressions of criticism toward the government. At the time, Israel was caricatured as intolerant 
towards expressions perceived as non-patriotic or as expressing disloyalty to the state of Israel or 
lacking identification with it. The public atmosphere of intolerance, persecution, and incitement 
began with the abduction and murder of three Israeli youths. Social networks became virtual bat-
tlegrounds between left and right, Jews and Arabs. Statements that were regarded as provocative 
or anti-Israeli led to silencing voices. Anger and rage were aimed at Israeli citizens, both Arabs 
and Jews, who spoke out against the war or against the Israeli government’s steps.   81
  OCHAOPT, Occupied Palestinian Territory: Gaza Emergency Situation Report (As Of 4 September 2014, 08:00 Hrs) (The 80
mission of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2014), http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/
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 The outrage and intolerance toward speech unfavorable of the war or protesting and criti-
cal of Israeli policy were fanned by elected officials and government institutions. Ministers and 
government officials broadcast a message that it is wrong to criticize the government for its ac-
tions (and deceptions) related to the Gaza Strip, or to protest against the fighting. An ACRI report 
explains that the Internal Security Minister, Yitzhak Aaronovitch, and the mayors of Haifa and 
Lod acted to prevent demonstrations against the war, although it is their democratic duty to 
maintain the right of Israeli citizens to demonstrate and protect their freedom of expression. The 
intolerance towards provocative statements gave the security forces –– including the police –– a 
green light to act and arrest citizens for their expressions of dissatisfaction or distrust. Many of 
the demonstrations were denounced as illegal by local cops without actual legal basis and 1,500 
protesters were arrested in one month. Moreover, people were arrested for things they had ex-
pressed on social networks, and the police carried out preventive detentions, even of minors, de-
spite its violation of both international and Israeli laws.  82
 It is important to note that, in general, the judicial system did not support many of the ar-
rests and the acts of the police and the government against individuals and freedom of expres-
sion. Citizens who spoke against the Israeli national narrative faced sanctions, detentions and 
different punishments. However, frequently, the jurisdictional system canceled the punishment 
and reprimanded the police. An example for the judicial system policy is the case of State of Is-
rael vs Ashraf Salomon. Salomon’s arrest was the result of a complaint that he posted on Face-
book, including slogans against Israel and Jews. Salomon was detained by the police and was 
brought to court to extend the arrest. The Magistrate's Court in Tel Aviv-Jaffa, However, did not 
 ACRI, Report Of Situation Of Human Rights In 2014, 8-982
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approve the police request to hold Salomon for more days and demanded they think twice before 
arresting people for their speech. The judge Itai Hermelin explains his decision:  
 
This is a period of tension and inflammatory social security that often causes people to 
express aggression and harm the feelings of others. Still, in a democratic country which 
upholds freedom of expression, there is no place to detain people because of statements 
as long as those statements are not soliciting an offense or calling for significant harm 
against another. The court was not impressed by this kind of case; it is, at most, mere 
statements which are the product of the heat of the moment, which is of course unfortu-
nate. In these circumstances, therefore, suitable alternatives to detention would be 
enough.  83
 Following the detentions and the requests for extension of detention, the law was amend-
ed in 2014 by the Ministry of Justice, who determined that the authority to submit an indictment 
related to demonstrations will no longer be under police authority, but under that of the court. 
However, a summons for questioning, even if it does not lead ultimately to an indictment, does 
produce a chilling effect on freedom of expression. The Israeli judiciary opposed direct limita-
tions of free speech such as arresting people for their speech or preventing protests and demon-
strations; therefore, the SC took the power of detention from the police and refused to prevent 
demonstrations that governmental officials asked to forbid. In a speech given by Attorney Gener-
al Yehuda Weinstein to the criminal forum National Bar Association in Tel Aviv in May 2013, 
Weinstein revealed that, “political factors, including the Prime Minister, approached me and 
asked me to prohibit and prevent certain demonstrations. I never gave up and always rejected 
their requests.”   84
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B. Exclusion of Haneen Zohabi from the Knesset for Six Months Because of Her Statement 
 Hanin Zohabi has been an Arab-Israeli parliament representative (MK) from the 
HaReshima HaMeshutefet (Joint Party List) since 2009. Henin has appeared several times in the 
headlines due to her provocative statements relating to conflict and the Palestinians’ narrative 
struggling against Israeli occupation. In July 2014, the Knesset Ethics Committee examined her 
words and decided to impose the maximum penalty of a six month suspension from the Knesset 
sessions. However, during this period Zoabi was still able to participate by voting and continued 
to receive a regular salary as an active member of parliament. 
 The punishment imposed on Zoabi was mainly due to her statements related to the kid-
nappers and killers of the settlement youths in the summer of 2014. She said, “they are not ter-
rorists, although I do not agree with them.”  Zoabi shined light on the kidnappers’ narrative in 85
an intense and vulnerable time for Israel, which drew criticism and resistance from the public 
and government officials. The committee explained its decision to suspend her by stating, “Zoabi 
exceeded the bounds of legitimate expressions of MK; she performed support for the enemies of 
the state.”  86
 Prior to the Ethics Committee’s decision to suspend Zoabi for a six month period follow-
ing her claim, the Central Election Committee had decided to remove her from the Knesset elec-
tions of 2015 for a similar occurrence during the election season of 2013.  The SC rejected the 87
decision of the Central Election Commission and ruled that Zoabi may take part in the elections. 
 Avi Jacob, 'Listen To MK Zoabi: The Kidnappers Are Not Terrorists', Kol Chai Radio, 2015, http://www.93fm.co.il/radio/85
116474/.
 Lilach Weissman and Chen Ma'anit, 'MK Hanin Zoabi Was Suspended For Six Months From The Knesset', Globes, 2015, 86
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 40
The SC’s decision was derived from its typical process wherein the prevention of a candidate’s 
participation in elections is rare.  Elimination of a candidate is done only in extreme cases when 88
the system cannot address the issue with ordinary democratic tools, instigated by a situation of 
doubt or indecision. The democratic system should promote the interest of freedom to choose 
and be chosen. There was no clear or strong evidence of incitement or support of terror in the 
petition against Zoabi, therefore the SC had to repeal the Election Committee’s decision.  89
 The Ethics Committee instead attempted to “punish” Zoabi. The committee’s decision 
stressed that “Knesset members have the right to express views that are different from the con-
sensus and to express public criticism of the government even during war. However, they should 
distinguish between criticism and harsh but legitimate protests, and encouraging the enemies of 
the state. A call to attack Israel’s legitimacy and to justify terror against Israeli citizens are not 
legitimate criticism.”  Therefore, according to the Committee, Zoabi violated article 1A in the 90
Ethics Norm of the MK, which takes into consideration first and foremost the promotion of the 
Israeli State’s benefit.  91
 Zoabi, with the ACRI and Adalah, submitted a petition to the SC claiming that the com-
mission’s decision was not legitimate. The central argument of the petitioners was that the Ethics 
Committee cannot impose a penalty on a Knesset member for purely political statements as a 
primary reason for violation of the welfare of the state. Nor are there any threats in Zoabi's 
words, propaganda or obscenity, slander, humiliation, defamation and/or contempt directed 
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against individuals or current political interests represented by the Knesset. Therefore, the deci-
sion to deviate from the policy of the Ethics Committee is discriminatory and disproportionate 
against a Knesset member representing a minority. In addition, Zohabi holds the right of immuni-
ty that every MK shares, to enable him or her to express themselves and take action without con-
cern for a future penalty. Penalty against MKs who represent a minority, because of their expres-
sion, leads directly to the tyranny of the majority. When the Majority does not accept the minori-
ty opinion, it is the end of the  democracy.  92
 Unlike the SC's decision regarding the removal of Zohabi from the elections, the SC de-
cided by majority vote not to interfere in the decision of the Knesset Ethics Committee. The 
court came to the conclusion that Zoabi violated rule 1A of the ethics committee of the Knesset. 
Punishment is indeed unusual in its severity compared to penalties imposed in the past. However, 
under the circumstances and in light of the petitioner’s harsh words and timing, the Court gave 
the committee the authority to decide. Moreover, for the majority of the punishment period, the 
Knesset was in recess, and the SC saw no reason to interfere.   93
 Judge Hannan Meltzer emphasized the distinction between the debate about the disquali-
fication of candidates and parties and discussion of the decision of the Ethics Committee, saying 
that the “disqualification of political candidate[s] is a serious blow to democracy, therefore the 
interpretation and application becomes scarce and strict […] However, the choice of the court not 
to get involved with the Ethics Committee’s decision derived from the broad discretion range 
 MK Hanin Zoabi and others v. The Ethics Committee of the Knesset and others92
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that the committee holds. The SC is more open to the reasons for the Committee to impose sanc-
tions against Zoabi.”  94
Chapter 3 - Analysis of the Evidence  
 It is challenging to derive one general conclusion related to the different examples pre-
sented throughout this work. At first, it appears that some government actions are inconsistent 
with the determinations of the SC. The question of whether the government limits freedom of 
expression beyond exceptional cases is still vague, even after reviewing the evidence. Moreover, 
the SC is not consistent in its decisions, sometimes approving governmental decisions that effec-
tively limit freedom of expression, and at other times repealing them. For example, in the Hanin 
Zoabi case, on one hand the SC decided to repeal the Central Election Committee decision of 
expelling Zoabi out of the election and the Parliament, but on the other hand, for the same 
charges, the SC decided not to get involved in the Ethic Committee decision to suspend her for 
six months.  
 In this chapter I will use the definition of freedom of expression in Israel, evidence that 
was presented in the previous chapters, and additional examples to explain how freedom of ex-
pression is implemented in practice in Israel. It is necessary to divide this between the approach 
of governmental officials and the approach of the judicial system. Each entity reviews freedom 
of expression and its limitations in different ways and are driven by different interests. I will 
show that the government tries to emphasize the Jewish national narrative and exclude other nar-
ratives from the official discourse. Therefore, the government intends to place laws that limit 
freedom of expression and the promotion of versions that conflict with its national narrative. The 
 Translation, Eyal Gross, 'The Reasons For The Court To Remove Zoabi: Training Disappointing Sanctions On A Political 94
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SC’s main goal is to make sure that the laws and the limitations do not conflict with Israeli de-
mocratic laws and the principle of free speech. 
1. Freedom of Expression in Israel in Practice  
A. Judicial Policy 
 As mentioned in Chapter 1, the SC considers freedom of expression a fundamental right 
and follows international standards, even though it is not included in the basic laws of Israel. The 
SC has to stick to the policy adopted, but at the same time, to deal with governmental and public 
pressure.  The Zoabi case is a clear-cut example of the SC’s policies on freedom of expression: 95
the SC did not approved Zoabi's permanent expulsion, but it did approve the sanctions against 
her. The attempt to ban the movie Jenin, Jenin is another example demonstrating that the gov-
ernment or official committees cannot arbitrarily ban a film or a specific narrative from Israeli 
society. Similarly, the protests that governmental officials tried to stop appear illegitimate in an 
evaluation of the legal system. The judicial system did not support many of the arrests, as well as 
acts of the police and the government against freedom of expression. 
 However, the SC approved the Nakba and Anti-Boycott laws. The Nakba Law states that 
public institutions, manly schools and universities, cannot mention Nakba or discuss whether Is-
rael is a democratic state or not, otherwise part of their budget will be cut. Similarly, the Anti-
Boycott Law determines that NGOs in Israel cannot promote boycotts of settlers’ products, or 
any other Israeli products, as a protest against the governmental policy in the occupied territory, 
otherwise they will not get NGO benefits. Both laws were approved by the SC because they are 
 Hezki Ezra, 'MK: Raze The High Court', Arutz Sheva, 2015, http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/95
198771#.VlEtXd-rSt8.
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not direct banning actions, but sanctions that the ministry of finance may use. Neither of the laws 
have been used, and when –– or if –– they are applied there will be a process that the ministry 
will have to go through activating the sanction. After having the sanctions implemented, most 
likely the affected party will appeal the decision, and the SC will have to discuss every case indi-
vidually to determine whether or not the sanctions violate freedom of expression. Ultimately, 
however, the laws exist and the SC approved them.  
B. Governmental Policy 
 The evidence from the previous chapter can also help us to compare government policies 
alongside those of the judicial system. Currently, both the legal system and the government re-
port that Israel practices freedom of expression and is committed to this right at an international 
standard. However, there are examples where governmental institutions limit this freedom or use 
sanctions against perspectives that are inconsistent with the government’s view. 
  During the summer of 2014, government officials tried to prevent protests and the police 
arrested a disproportional number of people in demonstrations for their expressions on social 
networks. Movies and plays that presented the Palestinian side in the conflict were also banned 
or had to face sanctions. MK Hanin Zoabi were suspended from the parliament for her state-
ments describing the Palestinian narrative. Boycotts are no longer legitimate tools to resist gov-
ernmental policy. Using the word Nakba is forbidden in schools. Describing the Israeli War of 
Independence as a bad day, or to question the nature of Israel as a democratic Jewish State, may 
also lead to sanctions. 
 Regardless of whether or not these actions have ultimately been approved by the SC, 
these are clear attempts by the government to control the information available to its citizens and 
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to limit and discredit any narratives that do not fit within the Jewish Israeli framework. The gov-
ernment promotes the national narrative while simultaneously trying to oppress other views 
through laws and sanctions. The government is aware of freedom of expression and its role in the 
Israeli legal system, and has produced laws that do not directly violate freedom of expression, 
but are instead forms of sanctions that indirectly limit free speech. 
 The best examples for using sanctions instead of actual limitations are the Nakba and 
Anti-Boycott laws: The Nakba Law started as a law against everyone who presents the 1948 war 
as a catastrophe and was more rigid, stipulating imprisonment as one of the penalties. This pro-
posal was abandoned, and subsequently replaced by the Amendment No. 40 to the Budget Foun-
dations Law. The Amendment itself changed over time in order to better adjust to the Israeli real-
ity.  The same thing happened to the Anti-Boycott Law: The SC found the law legitimate be96 -
cause its punishment is a financial sanction and it requires a lengthy enforcement process. It 
seems that the government learned how to limit freedom of expression and still play (nominally) 
by the democratic roles enforced by Israeli jurisdiction.   
 A good example of the way government ministries adopted new strategies to limit dis-
courses and narratives that are not consistent with the Israeli Jewish narrative is the response of 
the Minister of Culture, Miri Regev, to the play “The Corresponding Time.” Mrs. Regev ordered 
the budget of the presenting theater cut. As a justification, she announced to the media that she is 
not limiting free expression because the director still can present this play, and the theater can 
 The orthodox high school in Haifa Alumni v. The minister of Treasure and the Knesset, 3429/11 (The High Court of Justice מן 96
Israel 2012).
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still work with its script. However she will not allow her office to support a work that was creat-
ed by a security prisoner, or in her words, a “terrorist.”     97
 Regev used the same technique when she heard that the Arab-Israeli actor Norman Issa 
had refused to perform in front of settlers in the occupied territories. She threatened to pull out 
state funding from Elmina Theater, a children’s theater in Jaffa that is managed by Issa. Issa said 
it was unfair to expect him to go against his own conscience and to appear in places which are 
controversial.  Regev called on Issa to reconsider his decision, saying, “I believe in coexistence, 98
and we decided to support his theater, but he does not believe in coexistence himself. If he did, 
he would go to the Jordan Valley […] If Norman does not withdraw his decision I intend to re-
consider the ministry’s support for the Elmina Theater which he manages.”  Regev did not di99 -
rectly limited the free expression of Issa against the settlers, but rather threatened to reevaluate 
the budget for the theater he manages, effectively using a sanction to limit freedom of expres-
sion.  
C. The Impact of Sanctions  
 The Attorney General sent a message to Ragev regarding the Al-Midan Theater, arguing 
that public financial support is essential to the existence of cultural institutions. Therefore dam-
aging the funding of a cultural institution can harm its freedom of expression.  Without this 100
funding the security prisoners would not be able to tell their story and to express their narrative. 
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Public funding is also essential to the children’s theater in Jaffa and to most culture institutions. 
It is difficult for a cultural institution to prosper in Israel without financial support, especially 
when most other institutions are supported by the government.  Israel is a welfare state and most 
Israeli institutions and organizations are supported by the government.  Therefore, it is a threat 101
to freedom of expression when the government decides which institutions will survive and which 
will fall. 
 Similarly, public schools and universities cannot thrive without governmental support, so 
non-profit organizations need the special tax reductions they are entitled to. Most schools in Is-
rael, especially in Arab-Israeli communities, are public and get funding from the government. All 
universities and many other higher educational institutions also depend on financial support.  102
Therefore, the institutions tend not to take the risk of approving any curriculum that presents the 
Palestinian narrative or may be considered a violation of the Nakba law. At the same time, NGOs 
and non profits can no longer use boycotts as legitimate tools to protest against government poli-
cies, instead trying to use other methods that do not jeopardize their necessary tax reductions.   
 The ACRI and Adalah contend that even though the Nakba and Anti-Boycott laws have 
never been enforced, they are still functioning as a “chilling effect” on freedom of expression 
because institutions self-censor out of fear of losing funding. The government got its wish, and 
the space for different perspectives and legitimate tools of protesting against the government are 
automatically reduced, without enforcing the new laws in practice. Adalah and other human 
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rights organizations highlight this dangerous situation when limitations of free speech are not 
usually approved by the SC, but sanctions are.  103
 Using the sanctions technique to further marginalize undesired narratives works well for 
the Israeli government. In spite of the strict policy of the SC concerning free speech, the gov-
ernment has developed a new way to negotiate with the SC by using sanctions in order to avoid 
narratives and protests that are inconsistent with its policy and ideology. In the next section, I 
will demonstrate that organizations or individuals that wish to promote an alternative view to the 
Jewish Israeli narrative face a series of difficulties, including in the financial sanctions.  
2. The Debate About Narratives 
 The main alternative to the Jewish Israeli narrative is the Palestinian narrative. Yet, due to 
the sanctions mechanism, it is prohibited from being depicted in the public sphere. The expres-
sion of those perspectives may result in penalties set by law, even tough various minority groups 
believe in the Palestinian narrative, or use its elements to develop their own narratives. Given 
that those limitations cannot be direct, the Israeli government deliberately responds to alternative 
versions of the Israeli-Jewish narrative by implementing sanctions. Consequently, there is a par-
allel conflict of narratives and ideas taking place between both sides.  
A. National Security as a Justification for Limitations and Sanctions of Free Speech  
 Israeli parties that seek to limit free expression in Israel frequently claim, convincingly, 
that there is anxiety about national security or incitements to racism. In the Nakba case, beyond 
  Acri.org.il, 'Association For Civil Rights In Israel (ACRI)High Court Ignores Chilling Effect Caused By The “Nakba Law”  |', 103
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claiming that the Nakba is a total lie, Israeli parties go further and appeal to concerns of national 
security. Similarly, one newspaper reported this issue as a “political-security” matter, saying that 
the State of Israel has the right to defend itself from the hostility of those who do not believe in 
the right of its existence.  According to the mentioned parties, teaching Arab citizens about, or 104
even mentioning, Nakba increases the sense of alienation and the negative attitude to Arab-
Israelis. The same reasoning applies to the educational system, the Anti-Boycott Law, and the 
sanctions on films, theaters, and social media postings.  
 Limor Livnat, former parliament member, said the following about the Nakba Law: 
“once we taught the Arab-Israeli students that the Jews expelled them from their homes, they 
would conclude that they should go out armed, struggling against Israel. The result will be the 
fact that we grow in our own hands a fifth column.”  The Israeli government sticks to this 105
argument to avoid any promotion of conflicting narratives. According to government officials, 
the argument that Israel is not a Jewish and democratic state poses a threat to the very existence 
of the state, since those are its fundamental principles. The point being made is simply that the 
restrictions represented by the laws and sanctions show us that the Israeli government believes it 
has the right to limit this kind of speech.  106
 In other democratic countries, mostly those not experiencing an ongoing conflict, limiting 
freedom of expression and narratives would not be seen as legitimate or necessary. Given Israel’s 
special situation, however, the argument of risk posed to the national security and limiting 
expressions may appear reasonable. As was mentioned by Livnat, other parliament members, and 
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the SC judges, the state has to defend itself from its enemies and potential threats. According to 
this argument, the Palestinian narrative, boycotts against Israel, and demonstrations against the 
government during turbulent periods represent a threat to national security; to limit it, in this 
context, is one to the overall exceptions of freedom of expression. Therefore, the government has 
the right to stop funding or to cut the budget of institutions that express themselves against its 
policy or present controversial narratives. 
 A deeper analysis is required to check if Livant's argument is consistent with the values 
of Israeli law. Livnat contends that there is a wide gap between acknowledging different 
narratives and protesting against government policies, to tangible security threats against the 
state. The Israeli SC has determined again and again that limiting freedom of expression is 
justified only in extreme cases where there is a very high probability of harm being done to the 
state’s public security. Therefore, limiting the right of free speech in Israel by sanctions due to a 
hypothetical national security threat sets a worrisome precedent. Moreover, it is naïve to think 
that pushing out the Palestinian narrative from the educational system and cutting the budgets of 
organizations which promote it will prevent people from spreading the Palestinian narrative.  107
 However, it is very likely that the parties which supported the sanctions are genuinely 
concerned for the survival of the state of Israel. As Sa’ar, former education ministry says, “Israel 
does not look objectively at the whole picture, but first of all thinks about its own interest.”  108
Considering that 20 percent of Israelis are actually Arab-Israelis who used to be Palestinians, it is 
necessary to take actions to forestall hostility. The Jewish Nation and the Israeli State are 
predicated on the fact that someone, ever since the dawn of the history, has always tried to 
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eradicate them. It started with Pharaohs, the kings of ancient Egypt, continued in Europe with the 
Inquisition, and culminated in the Holocaust. Those threats erupted again with the 1973 war, and 
are still going on with the Iranian nuclear-weapon threat.  Therefore, it is conceivable that 109
promoting the Palestinian narrative, or protesting against government policy is frightening to 
politicians in the Israeli government. The sanctions are just one of many expressions that match 
this anxiety. 
B. Rethinking the Palestinian Narrative as an Obstacle to Peace and Security 
 Nevertheless, contemporary authors cast doubt on the efficacy of Israeli attempts to 
repress the Palestinian narrative with laws and sanctions in order to safeguard national security. 
Research done by Elazar Barkan and by Sarah Maddison shows that allowing freedom of 
expression and narratives increases peace in an area. Barkan developed his “shared narrative 
theory” which poses that peace can only be achieved if the conflicting parties reconcile their 
historical narratives. Barkan points out that, in conflicts, the more powerful party’s narrative is 
considered legitimate, preventing the less-powerful party’s narrative from being shared and 
acknowledged, and undermining the possibility of understanding between the parties. No attempt 
to achieve reconciliation in a conflict situation will succeed without efforts to build trust between 
the two opposing parties and reconcile their historical narratives.  Sarah Maddison adds the 110
notion of “agonistic democracy,” arguing that open educational debates can play the role of non-
 Ophir Jacobson, 'Anti-Semitism Through The Ages', Amigo Magazine, 2015, http://www.e-mago.co.il/magazine-206.htm. 109
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violent conflicts within reconciliation efforts that accept conflict as both enduring and 
necessary.  111
 Similar research about the role of collective memory and freedom of expression in 
reconciliation has also been done among youths in Israel. In his article “Who is Afraid of the 
Nakba” for the newspaper Haaretz, Uer Kashty presents research that shows that a critical study 
of both narratives would help to promote the understanding between young students from both 
sides. Dr. Tsafrir Goldberg, who did the research, explains that critical discussion about the 
history of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict raises the ability to have a dialogue. However, the 
research was ignored by the government, which dismissed the study claiming that an illegal 
textbook had been used on it. The textbook was illegal because it portrayed both narratives, 
presenting a critical review of the Zionist narrative.  112
 John J. Mearsheimer explains in his article “The False Promise of International 
Institutions” that security will be better guaranteed with coexistence, reconciliation, and peace.  113
Sanctioning narratives and denying the identities of minorities cannot lead to reconciliation or 
coexistence. Coexistence, however, does not have to come from either the shared narratives or 
the agonistic democracy theories, but rather could come from simply listening to, and thereby 
respecting, the other side. In his article, Barkan mentions South Africa’s Peace-Making 
Commission and other such commissions where people talked, told their stories, and listened to 
each other, saying that those constitute a very simple first step toward peace.  Similarly, Dov 114
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Khenin and Mohammed Barakeh said at a meeting of the Committee of Education, Culture and 
Sport Committee in 2007, that it is in Israel’s interest to allow different narratives in the Israeli 
discourse.  Doing so in schools and public institutions would allow citizens to grow up and live 115
in a pluralistic and democratic society. People do not have to agree with all narratives, but rather 
listen and understand the other side’s emotions and feelings. According to Maddison’s thesis, 
arguments between Israelis and Arab-Israelis will continue, based on the disputes between Arabs 
and Jews. However, debates and the conflict will be less violent, finding a peaceful place of 
expression within the democratic sphere.  116
 Protocol Number 294, 2007115
 Maddison, “Indigenous identity, ‘authenticity’ and the structural violence of settler colonialism,” 288 116
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Summary  
 Freedom of expression has an intrinsic value as an umbrella to protect all other human 
rights, and is also used for conflict resolution and assisting in the reconciliation process. Accord-
ing to theories of agnostic democracy and shared narratives, to put a lasting end to conflicts, both 
parts must be allowed to express themselves. When just one side has free speech privileges, the 
restrained society may opt for more extreme actions, such as armed conflict and terrorism. In this 
case, limitations of free speech are not solving national security issues but rather causing them. 
Currently, there is not an equal place for both narratives on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In-
stead, both sides use a lot of resources to promote their point of view and to oppress the compet-
ing narrative, strengthening alienation between the two societies. 
 Israeli governmental institutions often use laws or sanctions to limit the Palestinian narra-
tive in the national discourse. Having their perspective recognized gives each side the legitimacy 
to act and to fight for their rights, which encourages the Israeli government’s restrictions to the 
Palestinian narrative in different levels and areas. Aiming at making the Palestinian perspective 
illegitimate, and the Israeli perspective dominant, the Israeli government arrests people for their 
speech, bans Palestinian movies, and creates laws and sanctions that restrict the Palestinian nar-
rative. However, limiting the Palestinian discourse, is not consistent with the democratic values 
Israel wants to endorse. The Israeli SC finds itself repealing governmental decisions that restrict 
freedom of expression because they are not consistent with both international human rights law 
and the Israeli legal system. 
 The SC repeals official decisions that directly restrict freedom of expression, although the 
officials argue that they are protecting national security concerns, which can be a legitimate rea-
son to limit freedom of expression. At the same time, the SC approves sanctions and indirect lim-
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itations for that same reason. Given that the Israeli government has to consider the SC’s policies 
while creating limitations that oppress the Palestinian narrative, they have introduced sanctions 
to indirectly restrict the Palestinian narrative. Similarly to direct limitations, the main argument 
for the sanctions is tangible danger and national security issues. Because the sanctions are lean-
ing on the gray area of free speech limitations, the SC does not stop them, allowing the govern-
ment it to promote its agenda and oppress narratives that are inconsistent with the official Jewish 
Israeli narrative.  
 However, as emphasized by Barkan and Madison, research and past experiences from 
other countries show that endorsing the discourse of one side while oppressing competing views 
is a major cause of conflicts. The a step in conflict resolution is to recognize that there are multi-
ple points of view and interpretations. It is important for each side to be recognized and, at the 
same time, to be open to the other side's version of the facts. Finding a shared narrative that con-
tains both stories can bring both sides to a dialogue. Unfortunately, the Israeli government 
chooses to go in the opposite direction by sanctioning any narrative that is not consistent with its 
own. This policy polarizes both sides of the conflict, thereby exacerbating and perpetuating mu-
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